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REVIEWS
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, Volume IV, Division 10, Chapter 41,
As Adopted by the American Law Institute. St. Paul: American Law
Institute, Publishers. 1939.
HERE in these late sections (Division Ten, Volume Four) of the Restate-
mnent of Torts, the American Law Institute's most recent effort to promote
"certainty and clarity" and so to avoid either a confused "common law sys-
tem" or "rigid legislative codes," ' are tucked away certain chapters on what
"property" teachers have been accustomed to call "natural rights." Of these,
Chapter 41 deals with Invasions of Interests in the Private Use of Waters
("Riparian Rights"), Chapter 40 with Invasions of Interests in the Private
Use of Land (Private Nuisance) and Chapter 39 with Invasions of Inter-
ests in the Support of Land.
The query rises: why has the Institute removed all of these important
problems from the domain of "property" and transplanted them in "tort"?
Motion for removal came, the Preface tells us,2 from a "Property group"
(composed of distinguished "property" teachers and headed by Dean Fraser)
to which these problems--designated as "Natural Rights in Land"--had been
assigned. "After working for a year," this group recommended that what had
been "entrusted to them should be approached and restated not as a part of
the Law of Property, but as part of the Law of Torts, that is as limitations
on the use of land which are imposed by law on the possessor because such
uses interfere with the reasonable use of the possessors of neighboring land."
Some expansion of this notion is found in a subsequent scope note.8 "Ripa-
rian Rights," this note states, "are dealt with in the Restatement of this Sub-
ject, and in tort terminology, rather than in the Restatement of Property be-
cause, fundamentally and analytically, they constitute a field of tort liability,
and also because they are inseparably tied up with the subject matter of pri-
vate nuisance. . . . " ' Fundamentally and analyticallyf Whatever these
words may mean, the basic preconception which pervades these chapters is
that tort rationales are the best available controls for the important social
1. Preface, x. Note the curious limitation of possibilities here: the Institute's pro-
posed clear "common law," our existing conf used "common law," and "rigid legislative
codes."
2. Id. at vii.
3. P. 340. More explicit still is RESTATEMENT, TORTs (Proposed Final Draft No.
5, 1939) note to § 12. Emphasis on "property rights" has hindered the tort analysis of
surface waters problems. "As a result, the cases contain very little of analysis of liabil-
ity in terms of tortious conduct, intent, negligence, and other tort concepts which have
received intensive scrutiny and development in the last fifty years." Much difficulty has
been caused, it is alleged, by courts' confused and indiscriminate use of the word "right."
4. [Italics supplied]. The inseparable "tie up" with "private nuisance" (c. 40) is
not persuasive. Even the latter topic could have been more fruitfully treated in another
context, that of "land planning."
problems hidden behind "natural rights." r What, in terms of the scope and
policy perspective of the restatement materials, are the consequences of this
preconception? For appraisal let us examine in some detail Chapter 41 on
Riparian Rights.
The most obvious consequence of the tort distillation is the amazing amount
of omission which it requires. "This chapter is restricted," the first scope
note informs us,6 "to the private use of waters as distinguished from the
public use thereof for navigation, fishing and other public purposes, and there-
fore does not deal with invasions of interests in the public use of public
watercourses or lakes, or with conflicts between public and private uses."
Among the unspecified "other public purposes" could have been listed the
supply of water for city use, public power plant and flood control works, and
public irrigation and soil conservation projects.7 Nor is this all. In the ne::t
paragraph we learn that it is "not within the scope of the Restatement of this
Subject to state the rules governing special rights and privileges created by
way of grant or other consent, prescription, or eminent domain." 8 All "spe-
cial legal relations between the persons involved, such as easements, profits,
licenses and the like" are under the tort taboo. Finally, the doctrine of "prior
appropriation," despite its wide currency in a variety of guises,9 gets sum-
mary dismissal: "In view of the widespread tendency in most Western States
today to establish new water codes and to bring all controversies over water
rights under the jurisdiction of special administrative tribunals, no attempt
has been made in the Restatement of this Subject to deal with the law of
Prior Appropriation." 10 So much for "this Subject's" excision of problems,
doctrines and institutions. What remains?
S. Assignment of the subject of "natural rights" in "property" could have been con-
strued as an opportunity for comprehensive treatment of the whole problem of the use
and conservation of water resources. If it was not so construed, our criticism is directed
at both the "construction" and the "shaping" of the assignment.
6. Pp. 315, 316.
7. Many of the uses here listed as "omitted" get frequent, if scattered and impres-
sionistic, mention in the chapter. Bold as the Institute is in blackletter definition, it
nowhere comes to grips with its "public use" and "private use." Occasional passages
suggest that a use is public where people or things move upon the water and not where
water is extracted for use elsewhere; but other passages foreclose this inference. Pre-
sumably the Institute thus achieves the strategic position of being able to assert, when
an "omitted" use is mentioned, that such a use is public or private as its rules are appli-
cable or not. The fact is of course that "public use" and "private use" are polar terms
describing a continuum of uses. The physical unities of a drainage basin make simple
dichotomy futile.
8. P. 316. Cross reference is made to "Restatement of Property - Division, Servi-
tudes." If all of the omitted problems are eventually somewhere "restated," an intricate
system of cross references might conceivably provide a more comprehensive picture than
that here proffered. But at what cost? Physical, utilization and institutional unities must
be subsumed-and perhaps lost-under the artificial unities of the doctrinal structure.
9. Compare In re Pigeon River Lumber Co., 12 P.U.R. (x.s.) 432 (1935) (licens-
ing under Federal Power Act); Bean v. Central Mie. Power Co., 133 Me. 9, 173 At. 493
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Elaborate definitions of commonplace concepts, distinctions of a question-
able difference and repetitions of a doctrine of "reasonable user"- such is
the sum. Building about the traditional defiance of the hydrologic cycle, the
blackletter begins by defining, for eighteen pages," "watercourses," "subter-
ranean waters," and "surface waters" and such auxiliary concepts as "lake,"
"riparian land," "riparian proprietor," "use of water" and "harm." Most
basic of the distinctions which we are offered- in justification of a separate
chapter on interference with the use of water -is between invasions, through
the instrumentality of water, of interests in the use of land and of interests
in the use of water: water and land have peculiar physical inter-relations and
water unlike land and air is communal and scarce.' 2 Other distinctions, em-
phasized by blackletter and in separate sections, are between invasions involv-
ing and not involving competing use of the water 13 and between intentional
and unintentional harms.' 4 But if, with patience, we work on down through
the serried ranks of blackletter, comment and illustration we always- or
almost always - find that none of these definitions and none of these dis-
tinctions makes much difference anyhow; in the end whether we are dealing
with watercourses, 15 subterranean waters "' or surface waters,'1 whether the
harm is intentional or unintentional,' whether the invasion is of an interest
in land or an interest in water "I or by a competing use of a non-competing
use,20 we always get back to "reasonableness" or "reasonable use." 21 For a
use which causes substantial harm to another riparian proprietor to be rea-
sonable, its utility must, we are told, outweigh the gravity of its harm. 22
Utility and gravity? For weighing these imponderables we are given a table
of factors ("social value," "suitability of use," "burden of avoiding harm,"
"extent of harm") substantially similar to one expounded at greater length
in the previous chapter on non-trespassory interference with the use of
land.23 One additional factor only appears here. In determining the "utility"
or "the gravity of the harm" of a use, in controversies between riparians, the
classification of the questioned use as riparian or non-riparian is made "im-
portant." 24 By this oblique, very oblique, attack upon the concept of "ripa-
11. Pp. 317-336.




16. §§ 858-863, with cross references.
17. § 864, with cross references.
18. § 850 at 353. The problem of unintentional harm is stated as "fundamentally"
one of "unreasonableness," to be determined "through application of the concepts of negli-
gence, recklessness, and ultrahazardousness." The latter concepts require a cross ref-
erence to the whole of Volume II and to a few sections of Volume III of the Restatement
of Torts.
19. C. 40, §§822-840.
20. § 849 with cross reference to c. 40, §§ 822-840.
21. "Reasonable use" is preferred to "natural flow" because, though the latter is
"relatively more definite and certain," the former is more utilitarian (P. 344).
22. § 852.
23. § 853, 854. Cf. c. 40, H§ 827, 828.
24. §§ 853, 854, 855.
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rian," sale of water to non-riparians or diversion outside the watershed could
conceivably be legal.2z But note just how oblique- and here is our only
major recession from an all embracing "reasonable use" -this attack on
riparian is. The non-riparian claimant- that is, a claimant who neither
"owns" nor "possesses" a "parcel," not even a few inches of bed or bank-
without "special right" is given no protection whatsoever in his use of the
water against riparians making use of the water.20  He is not "within the
reason of the rule which protects the interests of riparian proprietors in the
use of water." 27 Utilitarianism, communalty and scarcity all succumb at
last to the peculiar physical interrelations of land and water.2 8
It is not our purpose to belittle the substantial achievement of Dean Fraser
and his advisers in getting the enormous prestige of the Institute back of
doctrines of "reasonable use," even as circumscribed by "riparian." So much,
so good; but it is not enough. So flexible a doctrine as "reasonable use" can
be made to serve the purpose of turning a court into an administrative body
for determining what is fair and politic under all the circumstances of a
particular dispute between individual litigants. Unfortunately, however, nei-
ther this doctrine nor any of its competitors can give a court the requisite
staff, training, experience and powers to carry out the affirmative, multi-
purpose programs which the public interest and the physical, engineering and
utilization unities of a drainage basin require.2 9 Flotds, drouth and soil ero-
sion make even the headlines in the daily newspapers scream not for "tort"
limitations on free enterprise but for planned, collective control.20 Going,
if not gone-save in the pages of the A.L.I.- is the easy dichotomy of
"private" versus "public" uses of water and with it the myopic assumption
that the public interest can best be identified and secured in the private law
suit. New ideas, attitudes, techniques and institutions - all beyond the scope
and perspective of the Restatement - are emerging to make vital this notion
of the public interest. Recognition of the interrelation of all forms of the
use of water,3' combined with a clear value-judgment that the benefits of
25. § 855, Comment a.
26. § 856.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Riparian land is defined somewhat liberally as "a parcel of land which includes
a part of the bed of the watercourse or lake or which borders upon a public watercourse
or lake, the bed of which is in public ownership." (§ 843). Riparian uses "are those made
on or in connection with the use of the riparian land." (§ 855, Comment a). What is
lacking is exploration of the "policy" alleged to have "crystallized" in these peculiar
physical interrelations.
29. This correlation of physical, engineering and utilization unities is borrowed from
CooKE, Physical and Functional Relationships in UrREA-,m ENGixEERiN; Col =acz,
HEADWATFRS CONTROL AND USE (1936). Mr. Cooke's exposition of the "unities" is most
persuasive.
With the "scenic" tour of the judge in .McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan .Mining
& Coal Co., 147 Fed. 981 (C. C. D. Idaho 1906) contrast the administrative control pro-
posed in NAT. RESOURCES COMM., WATER POLLUTION IN TIlE UNITED STATES (1939).
30. For excellent popular exposition of this demand and the reasons bchind it, see
White, We're Moving the Rain, SATURDAY EVENING POST. April 27, 1940, p. 18.
31. UPSTREAM ENGINEERING CONIFERNCE, HF.ADWATERS CONTROL AND UsE (193t);
NAT. REsOURcEs Com., DRAINAGE BASIN PRouLFMS AND PROGMMS (Rev. ed. 1937);
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such use should reach the majority of consumers,8 2 invigorates the regional
planning of TVA,33 of the Columbia and other River Basins,8 4 and under-
lies the Report of the Mississippi Valley Committee, 5 the administration of
western codes 86 and the factual research of the National Resources Com-
mittee. The problems created by conflicting municipal, power and agricul-
tural claims on the use of water, 37 the problems created by floods and the
measures taken for their control, 8 and the problems created by erosion 80
and pollution 40 have long since broken the bounds of the Restatement's
Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilizalion of Water
Resources (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 274; NAT. RESOURCES COMM., WA'rTER PLANNING
(1938); NAT. RESOURCES CoMm., DEFICIENCIES IN BASIC HYDROLOGIC DATA (1936).
32. Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the
State (1929) 1 Roc v MT. L. REv. 161; LAMPEN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
FEDERAL RECLAMATION (1930); ANNUAL REP., TVA (1939).
33. HODGE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (1938); AN4UAL REP. TVA
(1939) ; Report of Joint Committee Investigating the Tennessee Valley Authority, SEN.
Doc. No. 56, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ; Fly, op. cit. supra note 31.
34. NAT. RESOURCES COMM., REGIONAL PLANNING, PT. I, THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
(1936); NAT. RESOURCES COMm., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS (Rev. ed.
1937).
35. REP. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY COINt. OF PWA (1934).
36. Lasky, op. cit. supra note 32; Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law (1936) 50 HARV.
L. REV. 252; REP. ON STATE WATER PLAN, CAL. DEPT OF PUBLIC WORKS (1930); Cali-
fornia Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 (1935).
37. An illustrative group of controversies, from California, can be found in Herming-
haus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 Pac. 607 (1926), cert. denied, 275 U.
S. 486 (1927) ; Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. (2d) 351, 40 P. (2d) 486 (1935) ; Meridian v.
San Francisco, 13 Cal. (2d) 424, 98 P. (2d) 572 (1939); cf. United States v. Central
Stockholders' Corp., 52 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); San Joaquin & Kings River
C. & I. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U. S. 454 (1914) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Mc-
Ninch, 94 F. (2d) 601 (App. D. C. 1938).
38. Brief formulation of the problems will be found in REP. MISSISSIPPI VALLEy
COMMs. OF PWA (1934) 27-29; NAT. RESjURES" Comm., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMS
AND PROGRAMS (Rev. ed. 1937) 53-54. For recent litigation see United States v. Sponen-
barger, 308 U. S. 256 (1939) ; Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271 (1939) ; Cheese-
bro v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 306 U. S. 459 (1939) ; Franklin v. United States,
101 F. (2d) 459 (1939), aff'd on other grounds, 308 U. S. 516 (1939); Fly, op, cit.
supra note 31, at 281-284.
39. See NAT. RESOURCES BD. LAND PLANNING COMM., SUPP. REP., PT. V, SOIL
EROSION (1925); LITTLE WATERS, THEIR USE AND RELATIONS TO TIE LAND (U. S.
Soil Conserv. Serv. 1932). Compare techniques suggested by Thompson v, Andrews
39 S. D. 477, 165 N. W. 9 (1917) ; Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. (2d) 404;
Note (1932) 85 A.L.R. 465 with STANDARD STATE SOIL CONSERVATION LAW (U. S.
Dep't Agric. 1932).
40. For extent of the pollution problem and recent administrative developments and
recommendations, see the excellent study, NAT. RESOURCES COMM., WATER POLLUTION
IN THE UNITED STATES (1939). For variety and interplay of legal doctrine, see Jacob-
son, Stream Pollution and Special Interests (1933) 8 WIs. L. REv. 99; Comment (1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 630. The futility of attempting to handle the problems by litiga-
tion, even with tort rationales, is also suggested by Squaw I. Freight Term. Co. v. Buf-
falo, 273 N. Y. 119, 7 N. E. (2d) 10 (1937) ; cf., on retrial, 165 Misc. 722, 1 N. Y. S.
rationales, sprawled heedlessly across the boundaries of the individual state 4 1
and set in motion the processes by which new institutions are created.4 2 Can
the Restatement escape all these problems, attitudes, activities, and institu-
tions and still promote "certainty and clarity"? Or must it escape them if it
would promote "certainty and clarity"? Whatever the answer, Chapter 41
of the Restatement of Torts on Non-trespassory Invasions of Interests in
the Private Use of Waters, despite all of its tort rationales, definitions, dis-
tinctions and intricate cross-references, stirs but a very small eddy in the law
of waters; the main stream of contemporary drainage basin litigation and
administration has long since passed it by.
* M'%YRES S. M1cDOUGAL
t CHARLES RUNYON
JAMES KENT: A StUDY IN CONSERVATISM, 1763-1847. By John T. Horton.
New York apd London: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. x, 354.
$3.5o.
IN his inaugural Ezra Stiles, the new President, urged the youths of Yale
College to "observe how far the English law, whether by custom or acts of
our legislatures, has been embodied in that of America." In the best Latin
idiom of the day he insisted that "students would find it useful also to exam-
ine the great principles of the English law, both common and statute, for their
own worth; they would find it beneficial to follow the reasonal opinions of
the English judges." He predicted that, if a curricular place could be found
for so liberal a study, a great genius might arise in our midst-a Bracton,
Fleta, Bacon, Coke or Selden - who would wield the scattered fragments
of our emergent law into a great commentary. This tribute to the law, appre-
ciation of its English roots, prophecy for its native growth, came when the
Declaration of Independence was just two years old. In the audience on that
July day - with or without a hearing knowledge of Latin - was one James
Kent. This book is an account of the distinctive way in which the hope of
the President of the College was in due time fulfilled by the Yale freshman.
(2d) 589 (1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 582, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 459 (1939), aff'd, 281 N. Y.
794, 24 N. E. (2d) 479 (1939). For the wide sweep of statutory law see Notes (1931)
72 A.L.R. 673, (1939) 122 A.L.R. 1509, and especially PA. STAxT. A.N. (Purdon, Supp.
1938) tit. 35, § 691.
41. For recent and well documented opinions see Hinderlider v. La Plata R. &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938); Arizona v. California, 2,3 U. S. 423
(1930).
42. Note the state planning commissions [see NAT. RESOUnCES CoUx., THE FUrunn
OF STATE PLANNING (1938); NAT. REsouRczs PLANNING BD., CunnLtR Pnoasns or
STATE PLANNING BOARDS (1939)], the great variety of federal agencies [see NAT. Rz-
souRcES PLANNING BD., FEDERAL RELATiOnS TO LOCAL PLANNING (1939)], the regional
and inter-state authorities, and such local organizations as soil conservation districts,
rural electrification cooperatives, and flood control and reclamation districts.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
- Research Assistant, Yale Law School.
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A biography enjoys no immunity to the functional approach. In its com-
position a turbulent mass of material must be subdued to an art form; the
dominant principle of selection, arrangement, comment must be why one
wants to know. To the general public James Kent is now hardly a name; the
small group still interested or likely to be aroused are concerned with the
James Kent of Johnson's Reports later done into the Commentaries. Never
for a moment does the author forget his reference; an item must throw a
light upon the man-of-the-law to win admission into these pages. A severe
,test for focus is the treatment of "early years"; here the biographer keeps
both irrelevance and immortality upon the side-lines, displays the youth, re-
veals the mind of the jurist in the making. The boy saw "a broad sheet print-
ed with bold and elegant words that spoke of royal tyrannies and a freedom
to be vindicated with lives, fortune and sacred honor" -and was not deeply
moved. Amid the alarums of the war for independence, he became engrossed
in "an adventure with volumes written in sober prose upon the solid subject
of the laws of England." A youth to whom, in the midst of revolution,
Blackstone meant far more than the Declaration of Independence was al-
ready well on his way. His tniverse was shaped by Tom Jones, the Letters
of Chesterfield, the debates of the Linonia society whose library was so rich
in secular works as to make the name of Yale something of a scandal among
the devout folk of Cambridge. Amid shudders over a threatened raid by
Arnold, he received his diploma, a Greek testament and such admonition in
Hebrew as he could take away.
It did not take long for temperament, association, reading and experience
to equip him with a Tory universe. He fell easily into commerce with men
of standing, substance and sound principles. His admission to the bar by a
bench of three republican jurists, "filled with pomnp and port" and scarcely
able to attest his competence, impressed him with a want of the dignity which
the'law ought to possess. He followed Jay, opposed Clinton, was disturbed
by the principles of Mr. Jefferson. He read Hume, Sir Matthew Hale and
other stalwart worthies and shunned books saturated with the Jacobinical
notions of the French. A simple scheme of values brought ethics and eti-
quette, politics and the law, into a single grand accord. He associated "bad
manners with rude dress, low morals with bad manners and traced low morals
to Democracy." In a crescendo of. adjectives he found the populace "fierce,
licentious, profligate, even Democratic." To him Democracy was malum in
se, unpardonable because it was "the root of all other evils." And for its
antidote he turned to the common law of England.
A note of triumph - or of irony - marks his great work. As independence
became a reality, the new republic was little committed to any legal alliance.
Ignorance, the exile of the loyalist leaders of the bar, the lack of published
.reports set afresh the stage upon which a system of law indigenously Ameri-
can might have arisen. The intellectual resources to block a native develop-
ment had to be imported from abroad. The champions of an Anglican juris-
prudence came late to their task. Mr. Jefferson had led his rabble into power
before James Kent really got started; Joseph Story owed his judicial ap-
pointment to a President of democratical persuasion. But Kent with intelli-
gence, industry and unfaltering purpose turned his opportunity to full ac-
count. He overwhelmed American commonsense with the ponderous erudi-
tion of the English common law. He confronted every issue with a barrage
of precedent. To a judiciary just beginning to practice a learned mystery, he
opened the storehouse of knowledge and authority. And in order that his
views might prevail far beyond his own jurisdiction, he saw to it that his
opinions were printed and circulated. Even Jeffersonian judges, for want
of an equivalent arsenal, and less zealous in meticulous scholarship, were
unable to meet the challenge. Fate, too, was kind; for when the good repub-
licans of New York sought to end the enterprise by removing him from the
bench at an age at which a Supreme Court justice usually hits his stride, he
merely shifted his medium and carried on the more strenuously. He took
down Johnson's Reports, filled in the blanks, extended the gloss, articulated
a miscellany of items and scribbled the Commentaris. He created a broad,
comprehensive, authoritative corpus which was the law. It was as literate
as a classic, as persuasive as an oration. As statesmen were filling legislative
halls with the rights of men, Kent was writing the rights of property into the
law of the land. Against England a democracy had won the war and lost
the law.
All of this Horton recites with charm, conviction and corroborative detail.
He has not shirked the dirty work of drudgery nor drawn back before high-
ly technical material. If he had given perspective only, a presumption might
have been set against his "study in conservatism"; if he had merely emptied
his notebooks, the stark character of Kent's work might have been obscured.
But a forest which has not lost its trees is a rather formidable reality; it
sets the burden of proof heavily against any person who would dispute or
seriously qualify. The universe that moved beneath the man's hat and the
legal system of the Chancellor were as one; his importations from the Eng-
lish Reports did little violence to the everyday views he cherished. Given
either the man or his law, as the author recites it, and the other can be de-
duced almost unto minute statement. It is difficult to think of another jurist
who more rarely experienced the agony of conflict between professional
compulsion and personal conviction.
As such biography goes, Horton is tops. Either he is lucky in his subject
or he possesses unusual competence for his task. We have of late been treated
to lives of Taney and Waite, of Field and Miller; but this book possesses the
integrity which others of its vintage seem to lack. The biographer cf Waite
was never able to direct his eye to the ball; the life of Miller was saved from
myopic pedantry only by the appearance of the justice's own letters. As we
were beginning to believe that any indulgence in understanding was alien to
the biography of a jurist, this volume comes along as a welcome rebuttal. It
meets every academic requirement, makes an esoteric subject human, threads
its way through a technical maze without getting lost. And if it lacks the
swift idiom of the best American prose, it is - as if with ironical intent -
set down in the engaging style of an English classic. The author has not set
a standard for books of its kind; instead he has proved that the life of a
man-of-law can be written.
PreLTON Hm1Lal net
I Professor of Law, Yale University.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW. By N. S. Timasheff. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Committee on Research in the Social Sciences,
1939. Pp. xiv, 418.
SOCIOLOGY, as an independent branch of science, grew out of the collapse
of the great metaphysical systems at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
More particularly, it was the collapse of Hegel's philosophy which gave the
final impulse to the development of an empirical science of society. For three
reasons, the science of law was the last to be affected by this development.
First, the two systems of sodiology which dominated the nineteenth century,
Comte's and Spencer's, were, because of their positivist and organismic as-
sumptions, bound to underrate the actual importance of law for society and
hence to disregard law as an independent subject for sociological research.
In this they have been followed by almost all of the nineteenth century so-
ciological systems.' In the second place, metaphysics, after being defeated in
the field of general philosophy, firmly entrenched itself in political philosophy.
At the present day, the metaphysical desires of mankind still find in political
metaphysics a substitute for the satisfaction which general philosophy can no
longer afford them. Empirical science has succeeded only intermittently and
ephemerally in overcoming this strong psychological obstruction to the treat-
ment of state and law as social phenomena. Finally, jurisprudence itself is
the most powerful obstacle to the development of a sociology of law. For
almost a century, jurisprudence has cherished a metaphysical belief in the
"self-sufficiency" 2 of the legal order, envisaging the law as a sort of closed
system whose positive rules contain all that is necessary to the scientific
understanding of law. A mere logical process of interpretation would, in
this belief, reveal what the law is and what it means, and it would neither be
necessary nor permissible to go beyond the wording of the legal rules.
The merits and shortcomings of a systematic attempt at the sociology of
law must be evaluated against this background of a hostile and powerful
tradition, firmly rooted in positivist and organismic sociology, political meta-
physics and legalistic jurisprudence. Sociology of law, as understood by Dr.
Timasheff, exists only as a general theory of social interaction which excludes
the systematic sociological analysis of specific historic groups and concrete
situations. From this point of view, Dr. Timasheff's book is more than an
introduction to the sociology of law; it is a general sociological theory of law
itself. Its purpose is to analyze the social forces which are at work in law,
their typical manifestations and relationships in the stages of equilibrium,
change, differentiation and integration. Law, for Dr. Timasheff, is the result
of two social forces: ethics and power. The term "ethics," conceived here
in contradistinction to its usual meaning, covers the whole normative sphere,
comprehending morals, custom and law.3
1. A notable but scarcely noticed exception is ALEx, Du DROIr ET DU POSlVISM.
(1876).
2. POUND, AN INTRODUcION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1937) 57.
3. Although matters of terminology are of minor importance as long as the terms
are understood, this departure from the normal use of "ethics" is rather unfortunate. For
it inevitably leads and has already led (Cohen, Book Review (1940) 53 HARV. L. Rv.
708, shoots at this terminological rabbit with the heavy artillery of Hobbes, Bentham,
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The first of the book's four divisions, Sociology and Law, deals with The
Sociological Place of Law, The Place of the Sociology of Law in Science and
The Historical Development of the Sociology of Law. The three other parts
deal respectively with the sociology of ethics, of power and of law. This
book's original contribution to the sciences of law and sociology rests in its
consistent application of the mechanical point of view to the normative sphere.
As an attempt in this direction, Dr. Timasheff's work is unequalled for its
encyclopedic use of literature and its breadth of systematic purpose. The
book is unique in its mechanical analysis of the elements of the normative
sphere, and its treatment of the logically possible and historically real mani-
festations, relationships and modifications of these elements. The work is a
sort of chemistry of the normative sphere - the author, in fact, likes to draw
upon this field of research for his illustrations. The limits of a review forbid
enumeration of this book's many original contributions to different branches
of the social sciences. Dr. Timasheff reveals powers of analysis and syste-
matization which are unprecedented in this field. I am "particularly impressed
with the chapters on Retribution, Polarization of Power, Changes in Power,
Differentiation and Integration of Law, Imaginary Correlations, and Legal
Disequilibrium and Legal Disintegration.
It is inevitable that there will be matter for disagreement and criticism in
a book which touches so many philosophical, psychological, sociological, po-
litical and legal problems. The subject matter requires the use of abstract
language and the book necessarily makes heavy reading, but there is little
doubt that saying common things in a common way would sometimes have
lightened the reader's burden without sacrifice of terminological consistency.
In view of the tremendous amount of literature quoted and discussed, one
wonders why the names of Freud, Lasswell, Franz Oppenheimer and Rathe-
nau are not even mentioned. Important and elaborate theories, such as Kel-
sen's doctrine of the fundamental norm and the legal philosophy of the his-
torical school, are sometimes put to summary execution in no more than a
few vigorous sentences. I remain completely unconvinced by Dr. Timasheff's
polemic against my theory of international law 4 and believe that Dr. Tima-
sheff's own doctrine merely revives Jellinek's theory of auto-limitation with
its implied negation of international law.
Multiplication of such isolated instances of personal disagreement would
serve no useful purpose. But there is another criticism which touches the
Austin, Holmes and Gray) to confusion between the accepted meaning of the terms
referring to ethics and the meaning which Dr. Timasheff attributes to them. It may
even be doubted that the author has himself always been able to avoid this error. When,
for instance, he distinguishes between "legal domination and illegal or despotic domina-
tion" (the latter being devoid of justice), one cannot help wondering whether the ob-
jective or "generic" meaning of "ethics" has not been replaced here by the term's accepted
meaning (in the sense of morals) in order to distinguish between good, that is, "legal,"
and bad, that is, "illegal or despotic," domination. The polemic against Kelsen's identifi-
cation of state and law reveals similar reasoning. It is apparent that the argument here is
based upon "natural law": the good law of the liberal, democratic state and law as
such are identical; the bad "law" of the despotic state is not law at all. Compare, hov,-
ever, p. 301.
4. See also my remarks in Mforgenthau, Postihism, Funclionalhin, and Interna-
tional Law (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 276, n. 48.
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very roots of the philosophy and psychology of this book. The book's philos-
ophy is that of Neo-Kantianism, which dominated the continent at the turn
of the century. In reading Dr. Timasheff's volume, I was frequently reminded
of Kelsen's normative theory of law, equally based on Neo-Kantian philoso-
phy. And indeed, Dr. Timasheff's theory is in many aspects simply the socio-
logical counterpart of Kelsen's normative doctrine, attaining, like the latter,
its scientific achievements in spite of its Neo-Kantian assumptions. For both,
the final scientific aim is a system of general relationships, devoid of any
specific historical content. "There can be only one sociology of law," says
Dr. Timasheff. This is exactly what Kelsen proclaims with regard to the
normative theory of law. Timasheff's statement, " 'Ought to be' is a pri-
mary, irreducible content of consciousness" 5 might easily be a quotation
from Kant, Hermann Cohen, or Kelsen.
This leads us to another point of criticism: Dr. Timasheff's psychological
doctrine. It is not by accident that the author does not so much as mention
any representative of 'the Gestalt school, or of psychoanalysis and its deriva-
tive studies. Dr. Timasheff's psychological propositions are scarcely affected
by recent trends in psychology; they follow the static and formal pattern
of Wundt's structuralism which classifies rather than explains. As the study
of man's actions in society in the light of their psychological causation is
one of the aims of sociology, an antiquated psychology cannot but affect a
sociological theory which is built upon it. Had Dr. Timasheff paid more
attention to modern psychology, he would have avoided certain Neo-Kantian
atavisms and greatly increased the value of his analyses of ethical phenomena.
Finally, I wish to take exception to Dr. Timasheff's strange use of ter-
minology. Scientific terms are conventional labels which are useful only in
connection- with classification. This seems to be Dr. Timasheff's opinion in
theory, but not his practical attitude. Let us analyze an example. After
tracing to Thomasius the distinction between law and morals as that between
heteronomous and autonomous rules, Dr. Timasheff continues: "Later on,
the theory was developed by Kant and Fichte . . . The separation between
law and morals continues to dominate in French science . . . but it is also
often expressed in German science; for instance, by Gierke . . . Among
recent authors, Morgenthau . . . gives perhaps the strongest arguments in
favor of the traditional theory; yet he is forced to recognize that, from its
point of view (1) a value judgment concerning the behavior of another
cannot be moral; (2) a legal norm cannot create a duty. Both propositions
are refuted by facts; this. is, of course, a sufficient test, forcing us to reject
the hypothesis" [Italics supplied]. What are the "facts" which refute both
propositions? They are nothing but the conventional usage which attaches
the label "moral" to the value judgments referred to, and the label "duty" to
the correlative of legal rights. These labels have no cognitive value of their
own, nor are they "facts" which can refute statements concerning the things
to which they are attached. Dr. Timasheff would have us believe that the label
"Burgundy" on a bottle of wine is a "fact" which can refute the statement
that the wine in the bottle does not have the qualities which Burgundy wines
are supposed to possess.
5. P. 68. See, in addition, p. 90.
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Such weaknesses are inevitable in a book with a range as broad as this one,
particularly when the work has endeavored to build upon ground strewn
with the debris of previous structures. It is, in fact, surprising that the book
does not have more defects. The late Professor Kantorowicz has paid this
tribute to the unusual qualities of the work: "Dr. Timasheff's book is perhaps
the best treatment of its subject that has come to the knowledge of the
reviewer."'' I unqualifiedly concur.
HANS J. MORGENTHAU t
THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES IN ACTION. By Pen-
dleton Herring. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940. Pp. xx,
468. $3.75.
PENDLETON Herring, having given us excellent studies of the organization
of pressure groups and of their impact on administration, now widens his gaze
to include those processes of party government by which a common opinion
is created and maintained. Thc Politics of Democracy is an important book
because it gives systematic form to a revaluation of American government
which has been going forward in many places. We have long looked at our
institutions through spectacles colored by admiration for Britain: not Wil-
son and Bryce only, but several of our more recent commentators, have con-
demned us for what seemed perverse aberrations from the ideal form. But
the English election of 1935 and the unhappy way that led to Munich have
left many of us with grave doubts. The experience of the dictatorships mean-
while has caused us to look freshly upon institutions which we had taken for
granted or criticized as inefficient. "The vices of the politicians," says T. V.
Smith, "we must not compare with the virtues of the secluded individual but
with the vices of dictators." So John Chamberlain, in his American Stakes,
has recently been telling us that the old fashioned boss represents a basic
type of American liberal. And now Herring sets out with insight and enthu-
siasm to rehabilitate a fair portion of the rogues gallery of our political life.
This rehabilitation begins with the assumption that politics has for its
major task the creation of a- wide agreement. "Union," says Herring in a
revealing sentence, "has been and continues to be the underlying problem
of American politics." Without racial homogeneity, without congruous inter-
ests, without national memories running back into a dim past we must never-
theless establish for ourselves an unbroken common life. If that unity is not
to be imposed from above, it must be fashioned piece by piece from within
and continually refashioned as new interests emerge and as new aspirations
become articulate. In that creative process liberalism and conservatism, a
concern for the power of the majority and for the rights of the minority, all
play their part. For the function of politics is to insure that no group shall
be unnecessarily alienated by progress, and that none shall be permanently
6. Kantorowicz, Book Review (1940) 56 L. Q. REv. 113.
'I Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Kancas City.
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thwarted by adherence to the status quo. It is a process of adjustment that
requires "artistry, adroitness, and some science."
The task is as ceaseless as it is immense, but we must depend for its per-
formance upon the ordinary run of men. Politicians anxious to keep their
jobs, partisan zealots, advocates of special interests, are as important in the
construction of a shared opinion as those devoted to a large view of the com-
mon weal. Whatever folkways and institutions may bring these errant forces
into the service of the whole must therefore be judged good. Money, pat-
ronage, organization - the accepted horrors of the democratic idealist -
are seen in this context to play a highly useful part. A party structure radi-
cally decentralized, intrenched in that decentralization by the defeat of the
President's purge and the passage of the Hatch Act, appeals to those local
politicians who are able to collect and deliver the largest number of votes.
Third parties, dominated by principle, may have their special function in
sowing what the major parties will later reap; but to expect any clear divi-
sion of policy between Democrats and Republicans is to deny the inherent
genius of our system.
Those who think of political contests in terms of such conflicts of prin-
ciple will miss the point of much that is valuable and significant: they will
look askance, for example, upon the National Conventions. The Conventions,
it is true, provide little opportunity for effective deliberation; but delibera-
tion, as Herring points out, is not the only means of achieving harmony.
Manipulation and bargaining are also necessary, and these monstrous gath-
erings are rich in questions to negotiate and human material with which to
work. The Platform, to take another example, is a poor basis for predicting
the party's future condtict. But the Platform, too, is a useful institution if
judged aright: its value is in the process by which it is framed. Here pre-
liminary antagonisms have been ironed out and the way prepared for the
paramount task of choosing a candidate whom the whole party can support.
This approach to democratic politics clearly has some dangers. If the Plat-
form is judged by the manoeuvres which it encourages, will not debate also
be robbed of all meaningful content? If patronage is condoned as a means
of winning the allegiance of unconvinced minorities, will not the need for a
rigorous merit system be neglected? In carrying too far the cry of unity,
moreover, we run into such situations as Herring candidly discusses in his
chapter on The Limitations of Debate. There he suggests that issues which
tend to divide the people should not be raised in campaigns; he approves Allan
Nevins' opinion that Cleveland harmed the cause of tariff reform by intro-
ducing it into the campaign of 1888. Franklin Roosevelt did not bring court
reform into the campaign of 1936, but there will be many who question wheth-
er that omission was in the spirit of democratic government.
There is thus a tendency in Herring's thought toward anti-intellectualism
and quietism. He is saved from both, however, by a positive and guiding
faith in the underlying values of Democracy. "No Adams," writes James Trus-
low Adams proudly, "has ever been a party man." But if Herring is unwilling
to admit that this insistence of following one's own standards is characteristic
of the best statesman, he nevertheless sets a criterion of no mean nature:
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REVIEWS
"The highest task of statesmanship," he says, "is to preserve the democratic
system." That is a task, if it is rightly understood and resvlutely pursued,
which requires of a man all the courage, intelligence and magnanimity that
he has.
AUGUST HECESCIIER, II T
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE. By Norman S. Buchanan.
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940. Pp. viii, 4,;3. $3.25.
THIs book is the first attempt, since Dewing's work, to integrate recent
developments in the economic theory of the individual firm with the latest
legal and statistical knowledge about the business corporation. Now that
the attempt has been made with modern theory, one can see how much prom-
ise there is of enriching the field along the lines of Professor Buchanan's
analysis. The book is a pioneering study which suggests the need for similar
projects. Although it is intended as a text for college courses, it should be
read by lawyers, economists and business men who desire a sound and useful
approach to an old problem.
The most successful combination of economics and corporate practice is
in the third part of the book - dealing with business reorganizations. Be-
ginning with the distinction between the economic failure of a firm to earn
profits at the going rate and the business failure of a firm unable to meet its
debts as they mature, the author proceeds through a discussion of the causes
of failure to a description and analysis of the procedures of reorganization.
Although the lawyer will find the presentation of the legal phases of this topic
elementary, and the treatment of the economic phases will tell the economist
nothing new, the combination of the two problems will interest both. Profes-
sor Buchanan segregates five "critical problems of corporate reorganization
in practice" which an adequate reorganization machinery must solve: decid-
ing whether reorganization should follow upon business failure; providing
new capital to carry through the reorganization; handling dissenting minori-
ties; obtaining independent review of the plan; and keeping costs down.
Although this method of treating the subject is stimulating, this list is open to
some question. I would add to it at least the problem of determining priori-
ties, and the desirability of early completion of reorganization. But, all in all,
the device of selecting critical problems aids greatly in evaluating alternative
legal procedures of reorganization and keeps the basic economic problems
from being obscured in mazes of legal detail.
The chapters which treat the legal aspects of corporate enterprise are almost
as successful. The integration here is between generalizations about the indi-
vidual firm's place in the economic structure and the legal facts of corporate
chartering and government. This dual treatment enables one both to see the
management group in charge of a legal entity and to realize that the entity is
also an economic unit within which the management may make decisions not
directly related to the open market. As the size of the firm increases, the
Instructor in Government, Yale University.
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management's freedom of action is expanded, with important legal and eco-
nomic consequences.
The book's remaining chapters, although well worth reading, are less satis-
factory. The author's treatment of such problems as promotion, accounting
and expansion has not accomplished the desired integration. His emphasis
is on the nature of marginal analysis and its advisability in making corporate
decisions. Corporate managers have, no doubt, failed to employ this useful
tool to its full extent. But this does not warrant belaboring the point at the
cost of curtailed treatment of such matters as fixed and variable costs, cyclical
variations in the type of product demanded, present trends in accounting prac-
tice, the advantages of multi-unit expansion, or the effects of "leverage" upon
the optimum size of a firm.
Although it is an author's privilege to set the bounds to his own work, I
feel that the balance of Professor Buchanan's book is greatly damaged by his
failure to afford thorough treatment to the pressing problems of corporate
size and control, of governmental influences over capital markets and corpor-
ate financial practices and of inter-corporate competition.
Professor Buchanan's style is lucid and conveys the feeling that he has
done much reading and studying before sitting down to write. His bibliog-
raphy confirms the latter impression for it contains many useful materials
not generally cited, although it lacks a few standard references which are,
however, known to most students in the field.
This book will doubtless influence many students of the private corpora-
tion toward enriching their studies through a broader approach to their field.
While they are so doing, it is to be hoped that Professor Buchanan will con-
tinue to lead along the route he has charted.
PEARSON HUNT t
t Instructor in Economics, Yale University.
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